Information-driven coordination: experimental results with heterogeneous individuals

Viktoriya Semeshenko (1, 2) , Alexis Garapin (3) , Bernard Ruffieux (4, 3) , Mirta B. Gordon (5)

1 TIMC-IMAG - Techniques de l'Ingénierie Médicale et de la Complexité - Informatique, Mathématiques et Applications, Grenoble - UMR 5525
2 Departamento de Economía [Buenos Aires]
3 GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory
4 Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology
5 AMA - Analyse de données, Modélisation et Apprentissage automatique [Grenoble]

We study experimentally a coordination game with N heterogeneous individuals under different information treatments. We explore the effects of information on the emergence of Pareto-efficient outcomes, by means of a gradual decrease of the information content provided to the players in successive experiments. We observe that successful coordination is possible with private information alone, although not on a Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Reinforcement-based learning models reproduce the qualitative trends of the experimental results.

Domaines: Modélisation et simulation

Viktoriya Semeshenko, Alexis Garapin, Bernard Ruffieux, Mirta B. Gordon. Information-driven coordination: experimental results with heterogeneous individuals. 2009. ⟨hal-00404231⟩