Emergence of cooperation and selection of interactions
Résumé
The question of the emergence of cooperation in animal or human societies has focused the attention of the scientific community since the seminal work of Axelrod. We propose here a model which take into account the importance of local interactions in social networks and the possibility of selection of interactions at the individual level. Starting with the three main strategies observed in experimental economy : altruist, reciprocator and egoist, we show through analytical studies and simulations that this is a minimum set to see the emergence of cooperation in presence of egoists strategies. We then propose a scenario for the emergence of cooperation in to steps : a slow neutral evolution and then a fast one. With minimum hypothesis on the rationality of the agents, we explain the main phenomenon observed in real communities. Our framework is the evolutionary game theory with heterogeneous populations, repeated, directed and sequential interactions and overlapping generations. Keywords : complex systems, emergence of cooperation, social networks, evolutionary game theory, selection of interactions, directed graph.