Fault attacks on two software countermeasures

Nicolas Moro 1, 2, * Karine Heydemann 1, * Amine Dehbaoui 3, * Bruno Robisson 2, * Emmanuelle Encrenaz 1, *
* Corresponding author
1 ALSOC - Architecture et Logiciels pour Systèmes Embarqués sur Puce
LIP6 - Laboratoire d'Informatique de Paris 6
2 Laboratoire Systèmes et Architectures Sécurisés (LSAS)
SAS-ENSMSE - Département Systèmes et Architectures Sécurisés, CEA-TECH-Reg - CEA Tech en régions
Abstract : Injection of transient faults can be used as a way to attack embedded systems. On embedded processors such as microcontrollers, several studies showed that such a transient fault injection could corrupt either the data loads from the memory or the assembly instructions executed by the circuit. Some countermeasure schemes which rely on temporal redundancy have been proposed to handle this issue. Among them, several schemes add this redundancy at assembly instruction level. In this paper, we perform a practical evaluation for two of those countermeasure schemes by using a pulsed electromagnetic fault injection process on a 32-bit microcontroller.
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https://hal-emse.ccsd.cnrs.fr/emse-00998988
Contributor : Nicolas Moro <>
Submitted on : Tuesday, June 3, 2014 - 10:36:59 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, October 17, 2019 - 12:36:49 PM
Long-term archiving on : Wednesday, September 3, 2014 - 11:06:14 AM

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  • HAL Id : emse-00998988, version 1

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Nicolas Moro, Karine Heydemann, Amine Dehbaoui, Bruno Robisson, Emmanuelle Encrenaz. Fault attacks on two software countermeasures. TRUDEVICE 2014, May 2014, Paderborn, Germany. ⟨emse-00998988⟩

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