| HAL : halshs-00670994, version 1 |
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| Econometrica 53, 4 (1985) 873-888 |
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| The Strategy Structure of Two Sided Matching Markets |
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| Gabrielle Demange 1David Gale 2 |
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| (07/1985) |
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| We study two-sided markets in which agents are buyers and sellers or firms and workers or men and women. The agents are to form partnerships (which provide them with satisfaction) and at the same time make monetary transfers (e.g. salaries or dowries). The core of this market game is shown to have a particularly nice structure so that precise answers can be given to questions concerning comparative statics and manipulability. |
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| 1 : | Laboratoire d'econometrie de l'école polytechnique (CECO) |
| CNRS : UMR7657 – Polytechnique - X | |
| 2 : | Department of Economics |
| University of California, Berkeley | |
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| Discipline | : | Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances |
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| Intrahousehold allocation – Intergenerational transfers – Marriage market – Inheritance |
| halshs-00670994, version 1 | |
| http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00670994 | |
| oai:halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr:halshs-00670994 | |
| Contributeur : Gabrielle Demange | |
| Soumis le : Jeudi 16 Février 2012, 14:22:02 | |
| Dernière modification le : Jeudi 16 Février 2012, 14:22:02 | |