15803 articles – 31781 Notices  [english version]
HAL : halshs-00670994, version 1

Fiche détaillée  Récupérer au format
Econometrica 53, 4 (1985) 873-888
The Strategy Structure of Two Sided Matching Markets
Gabrielle Demange 1, David Gale 2
(07/1985)

We study two-sided markets in which agents are buyers and sellers or firms and workers or men and women. The agents are to form partnerships (which provide them with satisfaction) and at the same time make monetary transfers (e.g. salaries or dowries). The core of this market game is shown to have a particularly nice structure so that precise answers can be given to questions concerning comparative statics and manipulability.
1 :  Laboratoire d'econometrie de l'école polytechnique (CECO)
CNRS : UMR7657 – Polytechnique - X
2 :  Department of Economics
University of California, Berkeley
Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances
Intrahousehold allocation – Intergenerational transfers – Marriage market – Inheritance