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| HAL: inria-00424853, version 1 |
| Detailed view |  Export this paper |
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| Formal Aspects of Security and Trust, Eindhoven : Netherlands (2009) |
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| Probable Innocence and Independent Knowledge |
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| Sardaouna Hamadou 1Catuscia Palamidessi 2 |
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| (2009-10) |
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| We analyse the \textsc{Crowds} anonymity protocol under the novel assumption that the attacker has independent knowledge on behavioural patterns of individual users. Under such conditions we study, reformulate and extend Reiter and Rubin's notion of probable innocence, and provide a new formalisation for it based on the concept of protocol vulnerability. Accordingly, we establish new formal relationships between protocol parameters and attackers' knowledge expressing necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure probable innocence. |
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| 1: | Laboratoire CRAC |
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École Polytechnique de Montréal |
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| 2: | COMETE (INRIA Saclay - Ile de France) |
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INRIA – Polytechnique - X – CNRS : UMR7161 |
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| 3: | ECS Department - University of Southampton |
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University of Southampton |
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| Subject | : | Computer Science/Logic in Computer Science |
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| inria-00424853, version 1 | |
| http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/inria-00424853/en/ | |
| oai:hal.archives-ouvertes.fr:inria-00424853_v1 | |
| From: Catuscia Palamidessi | |
| Submitted on: Monday, 19 October 2009 05:18:08 | |
| Updated on: Thursday, 7 January 2010 23:41:13 | |
