Analysis of the Collision Resistance of RadioGatun using Algebraic Techniques

Charles Bouillaguet (1) , Pierre-Alain Fouque (1, 2, 3)

1 LIENS - Laboratoire d'informatique de l'école normale supérieure
2 CASCADE - Construction and Analysis of Systems for Confidentiality and Authenticity of Data and Entities
3 ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris

In this paper, we present some preliminary results on the security of the RadioGatun hash function. RadioGatu has an internal state of 58 words, and is parameterized by the word size, from one to 64 bits. We mostly study the one-bit version of RadioGatun since according to the authors, attacks on this version also affect the reasonably-sized versions. On this toy version, we revisit the claims of the designers and first improve some results. Secondly, iven a differential path, we show how to find a message pair colliding more efficiently than the strategy proposed by the authors using algebraic techniques. We experimented this strategy on the one-bit version since we can efficiently find differential path by brute force. Even though the complexity of this collision attack is higher than the general security claim on RadioGatun<1> , it is still less than the birthday paradox on the size of the internal state.

Domains: Cryptography and Security [cs.CR]

Charles Bouillaguet, Pierre-Alain Fouque. Analysis of the Collision Resistance of RadioGatun using Algebraic Techniques. Selected Areas in Cryptography, 15th International Workshop, SAC 2008, Aug 2008, Sackville, Canada. pp.245-261, ⟨10.1007/978-3-642-04159-4_16⟩. ⟨inria-00417797⟩