Influence and Social Tragedy in Networks

Yann Rébillé (1) , Lionel Richefort (1)

1 LEMNA - Laboratoire d'économie et de management de Nantes Atlantique

We model agents in a network game of strategic complements and negative externalities. Sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium and of a unique social optimum are established. Under these conditions, we find that players with more vulnerable locations in the network exert more effort at equilibrium, and that the most influential players should exert less effort at efficiency. We then find structural conditions under which each player exerts strictly more effort than her efficient level, whether the social optimum be interior or not.

Mots clés: social tragedy; Network; strategic complements; equilibrium; efficiency; social tragedy.

Domaines: Economies et finances; Gestion et management

Yann Rébillé, Lionel Richefort. Influence and Social Tragedy in Networks. 2014. ⟨hal-00924017⟩