Positional rules and q-Condorcet consistency

Sébastien Courtin (1) , Mathieu Martin (1) , Bertrand Tchantcho (2)

1 THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications
2 École normale supérieure [ENS] - Yaoundé 1

A well-known result in Social Choice theory is the following: every scoring rule (positional rules) violates Condorcet consistency. A rule is Condorcet consistent when it selects the alternative that is preferred to every other alternative by a majority of individuals. In this paper, we investigate some limits of this negative result. We expose the relationship between a weaker version of the Condorcet consistency principle and the scoring rules. Our main objective is then to study the condition on the quota that ensure that positional rules (simple and sequential) satisfy this principle.

Mots clés: Positional rules (simple and sequential); Condorcet consistency; q-Majority

Domaines: Economies et finances

Sébastien Courtin, Mathieu Martin, Bertrand Tchantcho. Positional rules and q-Condorcet consistency. Review of Economic Design, 2015, 19 (3), pp.229 - 245. ⟨10.1007/s10058-015-0173-x⟩. ⟨hal-00914900⟩