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Article Dans Une Revue The Journal of Development Studies Année : 2011

Do formulas reduce political influence on intergovernmental grants? Evidence from Tanzania

Lewis J Ishemoi
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Résumé

Subnational governments usually depend on the central government for a large share of their revenues. Therefore, a fair allocation of intergovernmental grants is essential for financing vital local services like education and healthcare. In Tanzania, and many other countries, regions that are better represented in the national parliament receive significantly more funds than others. Recently, Tanzania replaced the previously existing discretionary method of grant allocation by allocation formulas. We study whether this has reduced the effect of malapportionment on grant allocation. Surprisingly, we find that formula allocation does not significantly change this effect. This has important policy implications.
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Dates et versions

hal-00759560 , version 1 (01-12-2012)

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Maarten A Allers, Lewis J Ishemoi. Do formulas reduce political influence on intergovernmental grants? Evidence from Tanzania. The Journal of Development Studies, 2011, 47 (12), pp.1781-1797. ⟨10.1080/00220388.2011.598512⟩. ⟨hal-00759560⟩

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