Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria

Yannick Viossat (1)

1 CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision

If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator dynamics and the best-reply dynamics.

Mots clés: Nash equilibrium; replicator dynamics; best-reply dynamics

Domaines: Economies et finances; Analyse classique [math.CA]; Optimisation et contrôle [math.OC]

Yannick Viossat. Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria. Journal of Dynamics and Games, 2014, pp.537-553. ⟨hal-00756096⟩