Strict Liability, Capped Strict Liability, and Care Effort under Asymmetric Information

Gérard Mondello (1)

1 GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion

This paper compares the effectiveness of strict liability and capped strict liability regimes in an agency relationship among a regulatory agency and operators of risky activities. Under a double asymmetric information assumption (wealth and efficiency in care effort), it shows that capping liability is more efficient than keeping with strict liability, this at the price of an informational rent. Efficiency means that the efficient agent supplies the level of safety effort equivalent to the first best solution one. At the optimum, this rent is minimized by the efficient contract supplied by the principal.

Mots clés: strict liability; capped liability; risk; Asymmetric information; agency relationships

Domaines: Economies et finances

Gérard Mondello. Strict Liability, Capped Strict Liability, and Care Effort under Asymmetric Information. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2012, 168 (2), pp.232-251. ⟨hal-00727213⟩