Take It or Leave It for Something Better? Responses to Fair Offers in Ultimatum Bargaining

Rob M.A. Nelissen , Dorien S. I. Van Someren , Marcel Zeelenberg

We investigated if responders accept a 50-50 split in a modified version of the ultimatum game, in which rejection yields a higher payoff (€7) than accepting the equal offer (€5). Therefore, the decision to accept the 50-50 split in this modified ultimatum game cannot be perceived as a self-interest act, as opposed to the standard game, in which acceptance may reflect resignation in the knowledge that the equal split is the best one can expect. A substantial proportion of responders accepts the equal split in this modified game (Study 1), which clearly establishes egalitarian preferences. Further studies show that the willingness to accept is not an artifact of indifference towards the extra payoff (Study 2), but reflects true concerns for proposers' outcomes (Study 3).

Mots clés: Decision making; Ultimatum games; Inequality aversion; Non-selfish motives; Social utility; Other-regarding preferences; Reciprocity

Domaines: Psychologie et comportements

Rob M.A. Nelissen, Dorien S. I. Van Someren, Marcel Zeelenberg. Take It or Leave It for Something Better? Responses to Fair Offers in Ultimatum Bargaining. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2009, 45 (6), pp.1227. ⟨10.1016/j.jesp.2009.06.004⟩. ⟨hal-00707107⟩