Capital Control, Debt Financing and Innovative Activity

Dirk Czarnitzki , Kornelius Kraft

The present paper discusses the effects of dispersed versus concentrated capital ownership on investment into innovative activity. While the market for equity capital might exert insufficient control on top managements' behavior, this weakness may be mitigated by a suitable degree of debt financing. We report the results of an empirical study on the determinants of innovative activity measured by patent applications. Using a large sample of German manufacturing firms, we find that companies with widely held capital stock are more active in innovation, i.e. weakly controlled managers show a higher innovation propensity. However, the higher the leverage the more disciplined the managers behave.

Mots clés: C25; L11; O31; O32; Innovation; Patents; Corporate Governance; Limited Dependent Variables

Domaines: Économie et finance quantitative [q-fin]

Dirk Czarnitzki, Kornelius Kraft. Capital Control, Debt Financing and Innovative Activity. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2009, 71 (2), pp.372. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.017⟩. ⟨hal-00684396⟩