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| HAL : hal-00661903, version 1 |
| Fiche détaillée |  Récupérer au format |
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| Pareto optima and equilibria when preferences are incompletely known |
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| Guillaume Carlier 1Rose-Anne Dana 1 |
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| (2011) |
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| An exchange economy in which agents have convex incomplete preferences defined by families of concave utility functions is considered. Sufficient conditions for the set of efficient allocations and equilibria to coincide with the set of efficient allocations and equilibria that result when each agent has a utility in her family are provided. Welfare theorems in an incomplete preferences framework therefore hold under these conditions and efficient allocations and equilibria are characterized by first order conditions. |
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| 1 : | CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision (CEREMADE) |
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CNRS : UMR7534 – Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine |
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| Domaine | : | Mathématiques/Optimisation et contrôle Économie et finance quantitative/Gestion des risques |
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| Liste des fichiers attachés à ce document : | |||||
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| hal-00661903, version 1 | |
| http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00661903 | |
| oai:hal.archives-ouvertes.fr:hal-00661903 | |
| Contributeur : Guillaume Carlier | |
| Soumis le : Vendredi 20 Janvier 2012, 21:49:14 | |
| Dernière modification le : Samedi 21 Janvier 2012, 10:40:36 | |
