Cooperation in two-person evolutionary games with complex personality profiles

Tadeusz Płatkowski (1)

1 Department of Mathematics

We propose a theory of evolution of social systems which generalizes the standard proportional fitness rule of the evolutionary game theory. The formalism is applied to describe the dynamics of two-person one-shot population games. In particular it predicts the non-zero level of cooperation in the long run for the Prisoner's Dilemma games, the increase of the fraction of cooperators for general classes of the Snow - Drift game, and stable nonzero cooperation level for coordination games.

Mots clés: Population Dynamics; Prisoner's Dilemma; Mixed Equilibria

Tadeusz Płatkowski. Cooperation in two-person evolutionary games with complex personality profiles. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2010, 266 (4), pp.522. ⟨10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.07.018⟩. ⟨hal-00620583⟩