Strategic Behavior and Learning in Repeated Voluntary-Contribution Experiments

Laurent Muller (1) , Martin Sefton , Richard Steinberg , Lise Vesterlund

1 GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory

Voluntary contribution experiments systematically find that contributions decline over time. We use a two-stage voluntary contribution game to investigate whether this decrease is caused by learning or strategic behavior. Using a strategy method we find a robust pattern of declining contributions: contributions in stage 2 are 45 percent lower than in stage 1. Repeating the game five times we find that experience generates a smaller decline in contributions: stage 1 contributions decrease by around 7 percent per game. Finally we find no significant differences between the strategy and direct-response method, which suggests that our results help explain behavior in the latter.

Mots clés: Social Sciences & Humanities

Domaines: Economies et finances

Laurent Muller, Martin Sefton, Richard Steinberg, Lise Vesterlund. Strategic Behavior and Learning in Repeated Voluntary-Contribution Experiments. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2008, 67 (3-4), pp.782-793. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2007.09.001⟩. ⟨hal-00614682⟩