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Article Dans Une Revue Applied Economics Année : 2009

Rent-Sharing and Collective Wage Contracts - Evidence from German Establishment-Level Data

Nicole Guertzgen
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Résumé

Using German establishment-level data, this paper analyses whether wages respond to firm-specific profitability conditions. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the extent of rent-sharing varies with collective bargaining coverage. In this context, two conflicting hypotheses are tested. The first one asserts that unions exploit their bargaining power at the firm-level and appropriate a larger share of rents than the bargaining parties in uncovered firms. The second one states that unions favour a compressed intra-industry wage structure and suppress the responsiveness of wages to firm-specific profitability conditions.\ The empirical analysis provides strong support for the second hypothesis. While pooled OLS estimates yield positive estimates of the rent-sharing coefficient in covered establishments, dynamic panel data estimates accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and the endogeneity of rents point to a rent-sharing coefficient of zero.
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Dates et versions

hal-00582236 , version 1 (01-04-2011)

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Nicole Guertzgen. Rent-Sharing and Collective Wage Contracts - Evidence from German Establishment-Level Data. Applied Economics, 2009, 42 (22), pp.2835. ⟨10.1080/00036840801964708⟩. ⟨hal-00582236⟩

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