Social Categories and Group Preference Disputes: The Aversion to Winner-Take-All Solutions

Stephen M. Garcia (1) , Dale T. Miller (2)

1 University of Michigan [Ann Arbor]
2 Stanford University

Six studies explored the hypothesis that third parties are averse to resolving preference disputes with winner-take-all solutions when disputing factions belong to different social categories (e.g. gender, nationality, firms, etc.) versus the same social category. Studies 1—3 showed that third parties' aversion to winner-take-all solutions, even when they are based on the unbiased toss of a coin, is greater when the disputed preferences correlate with social category membership than when they do not. Studies 4—6 suggested that reluctance to resolve inter-category disputes in a winner-take-all manner is motivated by a desire to minimize the affective disparity—the hedonic gap—between the winning and losing sides. The implication is that winner-take-all outcomes, even those that satisfy conditions of procedural fairness, become unacceptable when disputed preferences cleave along social category lines.

Mots clés: behavioral economics; competition; decision-making; distributive justice; group disputes; social categories; social comparison

Stephen M. Garcia, Dale T. Miller. Social Categories and Group Preference Disputes: The Aversion to Winner-Take-All Solutions. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 2007, 10 (4), pp.581-593. ⟨10.1177/1368430207084721⟩. ⟨hal-00571672⟩