Can they beat the Cournot equilibrium? Learning with memory and convergence to equilibria in a Cournot oligopoly

Thomas Vallée (1) , Murat Yildizoglu (2)

1 LEMNA - Laboratoire d'économie et de management de Nantes Atlantique
2 GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille

This article analyses the possibility of firms learning collusive solutions in a Cournot quantity game. Starting from the results of Vallée and Yildizoglu (2009) and of Alos-Ferrer (2004), we study the role of random experimenting, social learning (imitation), and (updated) memory in helping firms to discover more collusive market configurations than those of the Cournot equilibrium (CE). We show that long memory and its update is necessary to achieve such configurations.

Mots clés: Cournot oligopoly; Learning; Evolution; Selection; Evolutionary stability; Nash Equilibrium; Collusion

Domaines: Economies et finances; Gestion et management

Thomas Vallée, Murat Yildizoglu. Can they beat the Cournot equilibrium? Learning with memory and convergence to equilibria in a Cournot oligopoly. 2010. ⟨hal-00526258⟩