Classical electoral competition under approval voting

Jean-François Laslier (1) , François Maniquet (2)

1 X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique
2 CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain]

We study a Downsian model of electoral competition with an arbitrary number of parties. The voting rule is approval voting. We assume that voters are strategic in the sense of the Leader Rule of Laslier (2009, Jnl. Th. Pol.). We show that if a Condorcet winner policy exists, then there exists an electoral competition equilibrium supporting this policy. Moreover, if the set of policies is one-dimensional and voters have single-peaked preferences, then it is the only electoral competition equilibrium.

Domaines: Science politique

Jean-François Laslier, François Maniquet. Classical electoral competition under approval voting. 2009. ⟨hal-00426448⟩