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| HAL : hal-00408871, version 1 |
| arXiv : 0908.0398 |
| Fiche détaillée |  Récupérer au format |
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| Analytical Study of Adversarial Strategies in Cluster-based Overlays |
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| Emmanuelle Anceaume 1Romaric Ludinard 1 |
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| (03/08/2009) |
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| Scheideler has shown that peer-to-peer overlays networks can only survive Byzantine attacks if malicious nodes are not able to predict what is going to be the topology of the network for a given sequence of join and leave operations. In this paper we investigate adversarial strategies by following specific games. Our analysis demonstrates first that an adversary can very quickly subvert DHT-based overlays by simply never triggering leave operations. We then show that when all nodes (honest and malicious ones) are imposed on a limited lifetime, the system eventually reaches a stationary regime where the ratio of polluted clusters is bounded, independently from the initial amount of corruption in the system. |
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| 1 : | ADEPT (INRIA - IRISA) |
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CNRS : UMR6074 – INRIA – Université de Rennes 1 |
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| 2 : | SUPELEC-Campus Rennes |
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SUPELEC |
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| 3 : | Laboratório de Sistemas Distribuídos (LSD) |
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Universidade Federal de Campina Grande |
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| 4 : | DIONYSOS (INRIA - IRISA) |
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INRIA – Université de Rennes 1 |
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| ADEPT ; SSIR - Equipe Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information et Réseaux - EA 4039 |
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| Domaine | : | Informatique/Informatique et théorie des jeux |
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| Byzantine attack |
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| Liste des fichiers attachés à ce document : | ||||||||||
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| hal-00408871, version 1 | |
| http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00408871 | |
| oai:hal.archives-ouvertes.fr:hal-00408871 | |
| Contributeur : Emmanuelle Anceaume | |
| Soumis le : Lundi 3 Août 2009, 18:24:13 | |
| Dernière modification le : Mardi 15 Septembre 2009, 16:54:58 | |
