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| HAL : hal-00391197, version 1 |
| Fiche détaillée |  Récupérer au format |
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| Theoretical Economics 4 (2009) 227-252 |
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| A Resurrection of the Condorcet Jury theorem |
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| Yukio Koriyama 1Balazs Szentes 2 |
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| (2009) |
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| This paper analyzes the optimal size of a deliberating committee where, (i) there is no conflict of interest among individuals, and (ii) information acquisition is costly. The committee members simultaneously decide whether or not to acquire information, and then, they make the ex-post efficient decision. |
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| 1 : | Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique |
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CNRS : UMR7176 – Polytechnique - X |
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| 2 : | Department of Economics, University College London |
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University College of London (UCL) |
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| Domaine | : | Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Science politique |
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| Liste des fichiers attachés à ce document : | |||||
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| hal-00391197, version 1 | |
| http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00391197 | |
| oai:hal.archives-ouvertes.fr:hal-00391197 | |
| Contributeur : Department Of Economics | |
| Soumis le : Mercredi 3 Juin 2009, 15:57:31 | |
| Dernière modification le : Vendredi 12 Juin 2009, 08:59:36 | |
