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| HAL : hal-00363218, version 1 |
| DOI : 10.1177/0951629808097286 |
| Fiche détaillée |  Récupérer au format |
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| Journal of Theoretical Politics 21, 1 (2009) 113-136 |
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| The Leader rule: a model of strategic approval voting in a large electorate |
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| Jean-François Laslier 1 |
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| (01/2009) |
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| The article considers Approval Voting for a large population of voters. It is supposed that voters evaluate the relative likelihood of pairwise ties among candidates based on statistical information about candidate scores. This leads them to vote sincerely and according to a simple behavioral rule we call the `Leader Rule'. At equilibrium, if a Condorcet-winner exists, this candidate is elected. |
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| 1 : | Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique |
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CNRS : UMR7176 – Polytechnique - X |
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| Domaine | : | Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Gestion et management Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Science politique |
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| Approval Voting • Condorcet • rationality • sincerity • strategic |
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| hal-00363218, version 1 | |
| http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00363218 | |
| oai:hal.archives-ouvertes.fr:hal-00363218 | |
| Contributeur : Department Of Economics | |
| Soumis le : Vendredi 20 Février 2009, 17:19:19 | |
| Dernière modification le : Vendredi 20 Février 2009, 18:42:47 | |
