



HAL
open science

Patterns of Identity: An Empirical Comparison of French and British Conceptions of Nationality

Sophie Duchesne, Anthony Heath

► **To cite this version:**

Sophie Duchesne, Anthony Heath. Patterns of Identity: An Empirical Comparison of French and British Conceptions of Nationality. National Identity and Euroscepticism, a comparison between France and the United Kingdom, Oxford, European Research Group, Department of politics, May 2005, Oxford, United Kingdom. hal-01052996


HAL Id: hal-01052996

<https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-01052996>

Submitted on 10 Sep 2014

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.



*Workshop: National Identity and Euroscepticism: A Comparison Between France and the United Kingdom
 Friday 13 May 2005*

Patterns of Identity: An Empirical Comparison of French and British Conceptions of Nationality

Sophie Duchesne

CNRS, Maison Française d’Oxford

Anthony Heath

Department of Sociology, Nuffield College, Oxford University

Preliminary remarks: There are not many empirical comparative works between France and the UK on national identity issues. Empirically (as theoretically), France tends to be compared to Germany (Dumont, Brubaker) while the UK tends to be compared with the US (Conover and alii). Part of the explanation of this lack may be the absence of available data. A new data set has been made available very recently, the 2003 edition of the International Social Survey Program (which is an annual programme of cross-national collaboration on surveys covering topics important for social science research. For a presentation of the results from the former issue on national identity see McCrone and SurrIDGE) dedicated to national identity. This paper is a very first exploration of this dataset.

What we should expect from the comparison, according from what is said – separately – from the one and the other (to be elaborated, with references: Deloye, Duchesne, Schnapper, Mc Crone & Kieli, Colley, Favell, Parekh, Heath & alii)

- France as the iconic republican model of national identity (see Miller’s National identity cover), universalistic and homogenising
- Britain: a very complicated story because of the two levels of national identity. Also supposed tradition of lack of nationalism, known for its multicultural model of integration of immigrants.

Indeed, a quick look at the data shows lots of differences between the two countries:

- o on the scale of attachment, more local for the British, more national and continental for the French

Level	France: % very close + close	GB: % very close + close	Difference
Town	33.1+40.8	32.4+47.4	- 5.9
County	37.7+16.2	45.5+18.0	- 9.6
Country	54.8+32.2	32.3+43.3	+ 11.4
continent	20.7+35.1	4.2+22.4	+ 29.2

- On the chauvinistic dimension, a more blurred picture: generally speaking, the British seems to be more chauvinistic, but they are at the same time, more likely to feel ashamed about their country than the French.

On the pride series also, a balanced result: the more intense general pride from the British is based on a much stronger pride in economic, military and politics achievements, while the French are only slightly prouder in cultural issues and on a very specific element: their social security system.

Opinion	France: % agree strongly + agree	Britain: % agree strongly + agree	Difference
World would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the French/British	6.7+12.1	10+22.8	- 14.0
Rather be a citizen of France/GB than an other country in the world	35.3+25.0	40.8+31.4	- 11.9
France/Britain is a better country than most other countries	11.6+30.3	13.8+35.6	- 7.5
When country does well in sport, makes me proud	28.4+37.5	29.1+42.9	- 6.1
Often less proud of France/Britain than like to be	15.9+38.8	7.3+44.4	+ 3
People should support their country even when the country is in the wrong	8.2+16.1	6.2+14.5	+ 3.6
Some things about my country make me feel ashamed	24.3+30.9	18.1-56.8	- 19.6

Proud of	France	GB: % very proud + somewhat proud	Difference
National pride	31.0+56.7	45.0+40.4	+ 2.3
Economic achievement	2.2+29.8	14.9+54.5	- 37.4
Armed forces	15.8+49.2	53.1+37.6	- 25.7
Fair treatment of groups in society	7.9+37.5	15.8+43.7	- 14.1
Way democracy works	7.4+50.8	16.5+52.8	- 11.1
Political influence in the world	8.9+60.8	10.6+48.7	- 10.4
Scientific achievements	24.5+62.5	30.1+56.1	+ 0.8
History	40.2+49.7	49.6+38.4	+ 1.9
Arts and literature	25.6+61.2	24.5+55.6	+ 6.7
Achievements in sport	10.7+65.1	18.1+50.8	+ 6.9
Social security system	29.6+48.1	11.8+41.0	+ 24.9

- The greater attachment of the British to sovereignty is very strong for economical and political domains, and gives rise to a fear deprivation of power from national organisations; while the French are more attached to cultural specificity.

Opinion	France: % Agree strongly + agree	GB: % Agree strongly + agree	Difference
For certain problems like pollution, international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions	44.9+40.6	22.0+46.2	+ 17.3
France/Britain should follow decisions of international organisations it belongs even if national government disagrees.	11.2+31.9	2.2+23.7	+ 17.2
International organisations are taking away too much power from the French/British government	17.7+32.6	16.6+40.2	- 6.5
Foreign films etc. damage national and local culture	19.4+23.5	7.6+19.2	+ 16.1
Television should give preference to French/British	16.6+26.4	11.4+20.4	+ 8.2

programs			
International companies damage local business	42.8+36.1	19.4+47.9	+ 11.6
Free trade leads to better products available in France/Britain	11.5+40.6	9.4+52.0	- 9.3
France/Britain should limit the import of foreign country to protect national economy	24.8+26.9	18.4+41.1	- 7.8
Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in France/Britain	12.7+11.1	12.9+17.4	- 6.5
France/Britain should follow its own interests even if it leads to conflict with other nations	25.7+34.4	14.9+35.2	+ 10.0
Benefit of the internet is that it makes information available to people worldwide	46.7+35.7	34.1+51.1	- 2.8

- o on xenophobia, apart from one item (Immigrants increase crime rates, where the French tend to answer more positively than the British), British answer acknowledge a clearly lesser tolerance to immigration.

Opinion	France: % Agree strongly + agree	GB: % Agree strongly + agree	Difference
Immigrants take jobs away from people born here	11.9+13.7	12.1+32.7	- 19.2
Government spend too much money assisting immigrants	27.2+22.5	31.8+35.2	- 17.5
France/Britain should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants	44.8+24.7	53.8+30.0	- 14.3
Immigrants are good for the economy	7.1+28.0	1.2+20.4	+ 13.5
Immigrants improve society by bringing new ideas and cultures	10.6+30.7	3.7+29.9	+ 7.7
Legal immigrants should have the same rights than the French/British citizens	18.8+27.2	5.5+35.8	+ 4.7
Immigrants increase crime rates	19.9+23.4	13.5+26.3	+ 3.8
Children born in France/Britain of parents who are not citizens should have the right to become French/British	36.2+30.1	12.5+52.2	+ 1.6
Children born abroad should have the right to become French/British if their parents are French/British citizens	31.1+42.3	9.8+58.9	+ 4.7

So is the front cover. But are these differences linked together? And more precisely: Is what we are used to consider as a “national identity” – let’s use as a starting point the very popular definition of Benedict Anderson, “an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” – a possible explanation for these differences?

A plain comparison like always risk to presuppose implicitly that each country may be considered more or less as an homogeneous entity that could be compared as such to others. Similarly, there is risk, when one tries to analyse empirically the notion of imagined community, to give it a consensual shape. While an imagined community may very well be a conflictive one. The questionnaire contains a series of questions meant to evaluate if a specific national sample has rather a civic or an ethnic way of conceiving the nation. We will analyse this series, trying to respect the possible lines of conflict of difference inside each of our two samples.

Section 1: The imagined community: an empirical revision of the civic/ethnic divide.

- **Brief reminder about the civic/ethnic opposition.** Actually, the opposition civic/ethnic is used on two different levels of analysis of national identity (for a extensive discussion see Couture, Nielsen and Seymour)
 - On one hand, it is used to analyse the very object of the nation and opposes modernist concepts of the nation with perennial ones (A. Smith).
 - On the other hand, it used to account for different modes of ideological construction of specific nations, different ways of imagining the national community. This is in that second meaning that the opposition has been popularised by Brubaker in his comparison of French and German national identities, but soon very much contested, and renounced by Brubaker himself.

Alain Dieckhoff in his paper will criticize the distinction both theoretically and empirically, referring to French process of nation building. Here, we will also criticise the distinction empirically, but referring to the way contemporary people do imagine the French or the British nation, according to our data.

- **The data:** presentation of a series of items meant for that purpose, the exploration of the civic/ethnic dimension (see Hjern as example of use of this series). The question: “Some people say that the following things are important for being truly French/British. Other says they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is? To have been born in France/Britain; To have French/British citizenship; To have lived most of life in France/Britain; To be able to speak French/British; To be a Catholic/Christian; To respect France/Britain’s political institutions and laws; To feel French/British; To have French/British ancestry.
- **Plain results:** French respondents are more numerous than the British to consider as important elements where the will of the citizen is at stake while the British are more numerous to consider his life characteristics as important.

Criteria	France: % very + fairly important	GB: % very + fairly important	Difference
To be a (religion: Christian/Catholic)	9.4+8.1	17.9+16.9	- 17.3
Be born in the country	34.6+26.5	47.4+26.0	- 12.3
To have French/British ancestry	25.5+23.7	30.0+21.5	- 2.3
Spent most of life in the country	33.9+36.8	35.5+37.1	- 1.9
Be able to speak the language	67.7.0+27.0	65.1+25.7	+ 3.9
Respect political institutions	75.5+20.8	50.4+36.0	+ 5.9
To feel French/British	65.5+26.4	44.0+35.4	+ 12.5

- **Analysis 1:** using factor analysis, we’ve checked the existence of two dimensions of opposing items which are supposed to belong to a civic and an ethnic conception of the nation. The result is not totally what is expected (note the great similarity between the two analysis in the two countries):
 - The second dimension does oppose two series of items: to be born in one’s country, to have lived there for most of one’s life, to have one’s country ancestry and to be of tits dominant religion load negatively on the second dimension while to feel French or British, to be able to speak the language, to have the citizenship and to respect laws and institutions load positively. But first, these series doesn’t match very well the usual distinction civic/ethnic. Have French or British ancestry and be from the dominant religion is indeed usually considered as ethnic criteria. But to link “be born in the country” with

the ethnic dimension contradicts the classical Brubaker's analysis. He considers the French concept of the nation as typically civic because of the *jus soli*, i.e., because the way the French law links nationality and birth on the soil (by contrast with the German tradition of *jus sanguinis*). Moreover, the item "feel French/British" is also considered as an important element of an ethnic concept of the nation.

- Secondly, this second dimension explains less than half the variance explained by the first factor in the French case, and less than the third in the British case. All items load on the first dimension, which explains quite a large amount of variance (38% in the French case, 46% in the British case). As if the most important difference between the respondents was their respective tendency to consider that any element is important to be truly French or British, before the choice they make between the different items.

Communalities	Initial	Extraction
		on
a. To have been born in France/Britain	1.000	.670
c. To have lived in France/Britain for most of one's life	1.000	.414
h. To have French/British ancestry	1.000	.702
e. To be a Catholic/Christian	1.000	.487
g. To feel French/British	1.000	.548
d. To be able to speak French/English	1.000	.518
b. To have French/English citizenship	1.000	.440
f. To respect political institutions- law	1.000	.529

Total Variance Explained Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	3.042	38.026	38.026	3.042	38.026	38.026
2	1.266	15.823	53.848	1.266	15.823	53.848
3	.809	10.115	63.964			
4	.745	9.309	73.272			
5	.650	8.124	81.396			
6	.598	7.471	88.867			
7	.545	6.809	95.676			
8	.346	4.324	100.000			

	Component 1	Component 2
a. To have been born in France/Britain	.728	-.374
c. To have lived in France/Britain for most of one's life	.625	-.152
h. To have French/British ancestry	.764	-.344
e. To be a Catholic/Christian	.597	-.362
g. To feel French/British	.517	.530
d. To be able to speak French/English	.568	.442
b. To have French/English citizenship	.653	.117
f. To respect political institutions- law	.406	.603

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. No rotation
2 components extracted. Country = F-France

Communalities	Initial	Extraction
		n
a. To have been born in France/Britain	1.000	.694
c. To have lived in France/Britain for most of one's life	1.000	.624
h. To have French/British ancestry	1.000	.744
e. To be a Catholic/Christian	1.000	.459
g. To feel French/British	1.000	.617
d. To be able to speak French/English	1.000	.475
b. To have French/English citizenship	1.000	.447
f. To respect political institutions- law	1.000	.760

Total Variance Explained Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	3.725	46.560	46.560	3.725	46.560	46.560
2	1.095	13.684	60.244	1.095	13.684	60.244
3	.749	9.357	69.600			
4	.645	8.062	77.662			
5	.609	7.614	85.276			
6	.500	6.248	91.524			
7	.399	4.988	96.512			
8	.279	3.488	100.000			

	Component 1	Component 2
a. To have been born in France/Britain	.733	-.397
c. To have lived in France/Britain for most of one's life	.779	-.131
h. To have French/British ancestry	.802	-.317
e. To be a Catholic/Christian	.631	-.247
g. To feel French/British	.691	.373
d. To be able to speak French/English	.659	.201
b. To have French/English citizenship	.658	.122
f. To respect political institutions- law	.442	.751

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. No rotation
2 components extracted. Country = GB-Great Britain

- A major argument can be used against this analysis: there is a risk that the first dimension be artificial because of the series of items analysed, people tending to answer mechanically to this kind of series, giving the same answer to questions asked on a similar way. Of course, there is no way to fundamentally refute such an argument. But we can try, using a different technique of analysis, to get another insight of the data.

o **Analysis 2:** cluster analysis.

Looking at the second dimension of the factor analysis, we've selected four items which load with opposite signs on the second factor: important to be a Catholic or a Christian and to have French or British ancestry for the so-called "ethnic" dimension; and important to respect institutions plus important to feel French or British for the opposing sign¹.

a Country = F-France: Final Cluster Centers

	Cluster 2	Cluster 1	Cluster 3	Cluster 4
(cluster number in the analysis of the French sample)	4	2	1	3
Important to be a Catholic/Christian	2	5	5	5
Important to have French/British ancestry	2	2	4	4
Important to feel French/British	1	1	1	4
Important to respect political institutions	1	1	1	2
Valid number of cases: 1468	7%	31%	44%	18%
(missing: 201)	264	453	638	113

a Country = GB-Great Britain: Final Cluster Centers

	Cluster 3	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 4
(cluster number in the analysis of the British sample)	3	1	2	4
Important to be a Catholic/Christian	1	4	5	4
Important to have French/British ancestry	2	2	4	4
Important to feel French/British	1	2	2	4
Important to respect political institutions	1	2	2	3
Valid number of cases: 812	30%	22%	29%	19%
(missing: 61)	247	174	239	152


We have analysed separately the two sample and found very similar patterns:

¹ We actually made lots of cluster analyses and present here the most readable. Let's also precise that we have recoded the variable in order to have more valid cases, coding the "can't choose" as an intermediate value instead for treating them as missing values. But we checked the cluster analysis with the original coding and got almost no difference in the clusters.

- One group of respondents who find everything important
- One group who find everything important except the religious belonging
- On group who find only important the two items that loaded on the so-called “civic” dimension
- A last group who find nothing very important and value only and slightly the respect of political institutions.

The first result here is that there is no such thing as an ethnically imagined community, in the sense that people who value religion and ancestry as criteria of nationality also value the two other criteria.

Second result: If the pattern of groups is similar in the French and British samples, the weight of the different group is rather different though. The British sample is distributed rather evenly amongst the four groups while in the French sample, the second and third groups are clearly dominant. The fourth one, which gathered people who find nothing really important in nationality matter, apart from respecting institutions, is much smaller (7% of valid responses). See transparent.



A quick interpretation of this distribution could be that the French are most consensual on nationality matters and the British are more fragmented. A concurrent interpretation would be that the British distribution is quite random, which results from a lack of structuring of the conceptions of nationality; while the French polarisation on the two central categories is the result of a long term politicisation of nationality, and a corresponding integration of the different elements of nationality into a main cleavage.

We will support the later interpretation with the following arguments:

- going back to the factor analysis commented above, we will show that there is not relationship between the two factors in the British case while there is one in the French case.
- We will look at the demographics and show that if age and education have a strong influence on the categorisation in both samples, it is even stronger in the British case.
- We will then show how there is a strong relation between party preference in the French case and hardly one in Britain
- And how there is a strong relationship between xenophobia and the conception of nationality in France and hardly one in Britain.

Section 2: A British pattern segmented and a French pattern politicised

o Return to the factor analysis

The different distributions of respondents amongst the two samples may be compared with the factor analysis presented above. Although the dimensions are similar (a first major dimension with all items loading and a second where half of them load in opposing ways) the relationship between the two dimensions are quite different. We have computed an ordinal variable with the factor loadings thanks to a partition of the distribution in ten equal shares.

	Ordinal variable constructed on the basis of the factor loadings	
	Pearson's R	Kendall tau B
France	-.2621**	-.2556**
Great Britain	-.0920	-.0186

In the French case, the two dimensions are clearly related in such a way that the more people value elements of national identity, the more they tend to value the so called *ethnic* elements – namely religion, ancestry, be born and have lived in the country most of one's life. This may seem a rather obvious result, as we know that on the whole, people don't value these elements without valuing also the civic ones; but it is different in the British sample. Although the cluster analysis also shows that people don't choose only religion and feeling British as the only important elements of nationality, the two dimensions – general importance of elements of nationality and opposition between two sets of elements – are statistically independent. So this is our first element in support of the thesis of a fragmented British concept of nationality by contrast with a French integrated one.

o Influence of age, education and religion on the conceptions of nationality.

1. Age

	Col	Pct	18-30	31-40	41-55	56-70	71+	Total
France								
	1		19	39	54	75	75	262
EVERYTHING IS IM			7,5	12,1	14,4	21,9	42,4	17,8
	2		63	94	109	134	55	455
EXCEPT RELIGION			24,9	29,2	29,1	39,2	31,1	31,0
	3		140	162	174	118	44	638
FEELING AND RESP			55,3	50,3	46,5	34,5	24,9	43,5
	4		31	27	37	15	3	113
RESPECT INSTITUT			12,3	8,4	9,9	4,4	1,7	7,7
	Column		253	322	374	342	177	1468
	Total		17,2	21,9	25,5	23,3	12,1	100,0

	Col Pct	18-30	31-40	41-55	56-70	71+	Total
Britain							
1		6	29	50	99	63	247
EVERYTHING IS IM		4,2	17,5	21,6	55,3	67,7	30,4
2		31	39	51	36	17	174
EXCEPT RELIGION		21,8	23,5	22,0	20,1	18,3	21,4
3		59	50	87	36	7	239
FEELING AND RESP		41,5	30,1	37,5	20,1	7,5	29,4
4		46	48	44	8	6	152
RESPECT INSTITUT		32,4	28,9	19,0	4,5	6,5	18,7
Column		142	166	232	179	93	812
Total		17,5	20,4	28,6	22,0	11,5	100,0

The age effect on the conceptions of nationality is strong in both countries. In France, 42% of the older generation consider that all elements are important in the making of a true French against less than 8% of the youngest; and on the contrary, more than 12% of the youngest consider that respecting institutions is sufficient for only 6% of the eldest. In the British sample, the difference is even greater: more than 60% of difference on the everything is important category (4% against 68%) and from 32% to 7% on the “feeling only”.

2. Education

	Col Pct	3-10	11-12	13-18	19+ or s till stu	Total
France						
1		92	66	65	26	249
EVERYTHING IS IM		34,6	21,1	11,1	10,2	17,5
2		110	117	158	55	440
EXCEPT RELIGION		41,4	37,4	27,1	21,5	31,0
3		57	111	304	149	621
FEELING AND RESP		21,4	35,5	52,1	58,2	43,8
4		7	19	57	26	109
RESPECT INSTITUT		2,6	6,1	9,8	10,2	7,7
Column		266	313	584	256	1419
Britain						
1		141	66	33	6	246
EVERYTHING IS IM		52,0	22,4	16,6	13,3	30,4
2		66	70	36	2	174
EXCEPT RELIGION		24,4	23,7	18,1	4,4	21,5
3		31	83	95	29	238
FEELING AND RESP		11,4	28,1	47,7	64,4	29,4
4		33	76	35	8	152
RESPECT INSTITUT		12,2	25,8	17,6	17,8	18,8
Column		271	295	199	45	810
Total		33,5	36,4	24,6	5,6	100,0

Similarly, the time that a person spent at school does make a difference in the way he/she is likely to value the different components of nation identity in France: 35% of the less educated consider that everything is important against 10% of the most educated, and 22% of the less educated choose “feeling oneself and respecting institutions” instead of 58% of the most educated. Again, the differences in the British case are even more striking: 52% of less educated in favour of

everything is important against 13% of the most educated; and 11% of the less educated for feeling and institutions compared with 64% of the most educated.

NB. The samples – especially the British ones – are a bit small for that, but a cross tabulation of education and age and the clusters shows that even if education and age are correlated, there effect are partly independent and cumulative:

	Older generation AND less educated	Younger generation AND most educated	Difference	Older generation AND less educated	Younger generation AND most educated	Difference
% Everything is important	56,6% (N=47)	7,8% (N=7)	48,8	69,0% (N=49)	None	69,0
% feeling French/British and respecting institutions only are important	14,5% (N=12)	58,9% (N=53)	43,4	7,1% (N=7)	63,2% (N=12)	56,1

So there is a strong effect of age and years of education on the way people conceive nationality but it is even stronger in the British case.

o **National identity and politics: a very different relationship**

1. Party preference

	Col	Pct	left	right	FN	other party	no party pref	Total
France								
1			49	96	30	5	47	227
EVERYTHING IS IM			9,6	23,0	50,8	33,3	14,3	17,0
2			135	149	17	1	114	416
EXCEPT RELIGION			26,4	35,6	28,8	6,7	34,8	31,2
3			275	157	9	7	141	589
FEELING AND RESP			53,7	37,6	15,3	46,7	43,0	44,2
4			53	16	3	2	26	100
RESPECT INSTITUT			10,4	3,8	5,1	13,3	7,9	7,5
Column			512	418	59	15	328	1332
Total			38,4	31,4	4,4	1,1	24,6	100,0

	Col	Pct	labour	lib dem	conservative	other party	no party pref	Total
Britain								
1			100	20	89	5	24	238
EVERYTHING IS IM			34,1	20,6	41,0	14,3	19,7	31,2
2			52	20	40	11	40	163
EXCEPT RELIGION			17,7	20,6	18,4	31,4	32,8	21,3
3			80	37	61	11	28	217
FEELING AND RESP			27,3	38,1	28,1	31,4	23,0	28,4
4			61	20	27	8	30	146
RESPECT INSTITUT			20,8	20,6	12,4	22,9	24,6	19,1
Column			293	97	217	35	122	764
Total			38,4	12,7	28,4	4,6	16,0	100,0

When looking at the party preference, there is a clear and strong relationship in France with the way people value different elements of nationality. The left overemphasize the more open

conceptions of the nation, either restricting the belonging to the respect of institution, or adding, in the tradition of the French revolution, the notion of feeling French to it (54 for 44 and 10,4 for 7,5). People close to the right tend to value more the two other categories (nationality based on religion, ancestry, feeling and respect of institutions, with respectively 23% instead of 17% and 36 instead of 31%). Lastly, people close to the FN, even if there are only a small number, very distinctively give importance to the complete set of elements: 51% instead of 17% on average. There is no such pattern to be seen in the British sample. There is a slight overrepresentation of people valuing all the components of nationality among the conservatives, but other categories seem random.

2. Xenophobia

A last and, according to us, strong element in support of our interpretation of the different patterns of national identity in France and the UK is the fact that the relationship between the clusters and measures of xenophobia is much stronger in France than in the UK. We will give two examples of this, but we've checked for the 9 questions concerning immigrants in the survey and this is valid in all the cases: in the French case, the relationship between the two variables is always much stronger than in the British case.

a. Immigrants are generally good for France/Britain's economy (agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly)

	Col	Pct	Agree st rongly	Agree	Neither agree no	Disagree	Disagree strongl	Total
France								
1			7	37	65	58	72	239
EVERYTHING IS IM			7,2	9,6	16,0	19,9	35,0	17,3
2			18	71	134	118	94	435
EXCEPT RELIGION			18,6	18,5	33,1	40,5	45,6	31,5
3			57	241	173	97	32	600
FEELING AND RESP			58,8	62,8	42,7	33,3	15,5	43,4
4			15	35	33	18	8	109
RESPECT INSTITUT			15,5	9,1	8,1	6,2	3,9	7,9
Column			97	384	405	291	206	1383
Total			7,0	27,8	29,3	21,0	14,9	100,0

	Col	Pct	Agree st rongly	Agree	Neither agree no	Disagree	Disagree strongl	Total
Britain								
1			1	39	93	79	20	232
EVERYTHING IS IM			11,1	24,8	31,8	30,7	31,3	29,8
2			3	22	43	74	23	165
EXCEPT RELIGION			33,3	14,0	14,7	28,8	35,9	21,2
3			4	70	101	53	10	238
FEELING AND RESP			44,4	44,6	34,6	20,6	15,6	30,6
4			1	26	55	51	11	144
RESPECT INSTITUT			11,1	16,6	18,8	19,8	17,2	18,5
Column			9	157	292	257	64	779
Total			1,2	20,2	37,5	33,0	8,2	100,0

In the French case, people who agree with the idea that immigrants are good for the economy are clearly more likely to have a more open conception of nationality while people who disagree or disagree strongly are much more likely to value all elements of nationality. The relation is a strong

linear one, almost without exception. There is also some relationship in the British case, but much less obvious, less regular, with exceptions on both extremes of the range of opinions.

b. Do you think that the number of immigrants to France/Britain nowadays should be increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little, reduced a lot?

		Col	Pct	Increase a lot	Increase a little	Remain t the same	Reduced a little	Reduced a lot	Total
France									
	1			3	7	26	50	158	244
EVERYTHING IS IM		9,7	10,0	7,9	15,9	30,9			19,4
	2			8	7	80	106	213	414
EXCEPT RELIGION		25,8	10,0	24,2	33,7	41,7			32,9
	3			14	43	192	144	113	506
FEELING AND RESP		45,2	61,4	58,2	45,7	22,1			40,3
	4			6	13	32	15	27	93
RESPECT INSTITUT		19,4	18,6	9,7	4,8	5,3			7,4
Column				31	70	330	315	511	1257
Total				2,5	5,6	26,3	25,1	40,7	100,0

		Col	Pct	Increase a lot	Increase a little	Remain t the same	Reduced a little	Reduced a lot	Total
Britain									
	1			4	5	26	57	145	237
EVERYTHING IS IM		25,0	16,7	20,0	30,8	36,2			31,1
	2			6	3	18	29	113	169
EXCEPT RELIGION		37,5	10,0	13,8	15,7	28,2			22,2
	3			3	16	59	66	76	220
FEELING AND RESP		18,8	53,3	45,4	35,7	19,0			28,9
	4			3	6	27	33	67	136
RESPECT INSTITUT		18,8	20,0	20,8	17,8	16,7			17,8
Column				16	30	130	185	401	762
Total				2,1	3,9	17,1	24,3	52,6	100,0

Here, the difference is less striking but remains. In the French case, apart from the people who would like the number of immigrants to be increased a lot, who are only 2,5 % of the sample, there is a steady, regular relationship between the clusters of nationality and the opinion relative to immigrant numbers, where people who want this number to decrease tend to have a conception of nationality more open and people who would like the number of immigrants to decrease tend to value all elements of nationality. While the table in the British case is less obvious. The same relationship exists as in the French case, but less regular, in particular for people who value nothing but the respect of institutions and people who value everything but religion – who are almost 40% of the sample – the pattern is unclear. The table below summarizes with a rough measure of association between the two variables – Kendall Tau B - the difference of intensity of their relations:

Correlation between clusters of nationality and opinions on immigration	France	Britain
Impossible for people who don't share customs and traditions of France/Britain to become fully French/British	,4027** N(1421)	,2432** N(787)
Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions	-,1729** N(1395)	-,0982* N(776)
It's better for society if groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions or better if groups adapt and blend into larger society.	-,2331** N(1211)	-,1445** N(599)
Immigrants increase crime rates	,3844** N(1398)	,2088** N(780)

Immigrants are generally good for France/Britain's economy	-,2912** N(1383)	-,0781 N(779)
Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in France/Britain	,4029** N(1413)	,2110** N(785)
Immigrants improve French/British society by bringing in new ideas and cultures	-,3167** N(1403)	-,1782** N(785)
Government spends too much money assisting immigrants	,3537** N(1373)	,1821** N(784)
The number of immigrants to France/Britain nowadays should be increased to decreased a lot...	-,3189** N(1257)	-,1549** N(762)

Conclusion:

This paper is the draft analyse of the ISSP survey 2003 on national identity. Comparing the French and British sample, we wanted to find out if the many differences that one can observe in the different topics of the questionnaire (identifications, pride, sovereignty, xenophobia) could be referred to a basic, structural difference between the French and British ways of imagining the nation.

The question is ambitious, so we got only small insights of a possible answer. Analysing the different elements that people find important to be truly French or British, we found similar clusters but with a very different distribution. And we tried to make sense to this difference.

We give in the paper different arguments in support of our hypothesis, which is the following:

- the pattern of British nationality seems a segmented one, mainly resulting from socio-demographic influence of generation effect and education. Young and educated people tend to give little importance to being British or to resume it to a formal question of respect of institutions or of personal feeling; while older and less educated generations give much more importance to the inherited aspects of nationality like religion or ancestry. However, the way people imagine the British community seems to be only weakly related to their political preferences and has only a limited relationship with their attitudes towards immigrants.
- The pattern of French nationality seems on the contrary a politicised and rather integrated one. The same socio demographic influence can be observed but as well as a rather strong connection with political belonging. Due to a long history of struggle since the French Revolution between Catholics and Republicans about the meaning of French citizenship on the one hand (Deloye); and to a recurrent presence of the extreme right in the political life since the beginning of the 20th century on the other hand; the French have developed an integrated and conflictive conception of their nationality, where the openness of the nation is permanently under question, as proved by the frequent reform of the "code de nationalité".

Today's workshop was organised on the basis of the following hypothesis: that differences in national identities could be part of the explanation of differences in Euroscepticism in France and the UK. This dataset doesn't allow us to make any link between the patterns we have analysed and attitudes towards Europe simply because the questions about Europe were not asked to the British sample. But these different degrees of integration and politicisation of national patterns of identity in the two countries could result in a new formulation of the workshop hypothesis: the French Euroscepticism may very well be linked to national identity because the French national pattern of identity is highly politicised and hence tends to integrate others attitudes or opinions; while the British Euroscepticism may not be related to the relevant national identity because there is not such integrated and integrative conception of the British nation.

References:

- Anderson, Benedict; *Imagined Communities; Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, Verso, 1983.
- Brubaker, Rogers; *Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1992.
- Brubaker, Rogers; "The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distinction between 'Civic' and 'Ethnic' Nationalism" in *Nation and National Identity: The European Experience in Perspective*, Hans-Peter Kriesi et alii eds., Zurich, Rueger, 1999.
- Colley, Linda; "Britishness and Otherness: an Argument", in *The journal of British Studies*, 31, 1992, p.309-329.
- Couture, Jocelyne, Nielsen, Kay and Seymour, Michel eds, "Questioning the Ethnic/Civic Dichotomy" in *Rethinking Nationalism, Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, suppl. Vol. 22, 1996.
- Déloye, Yves; *Ecole et citoyenneté. L'individualisme républicain de Jules Ferry à Vichy : controverses*, Paris, Presses de la FNSP, 1994.
- Duchesne, Sophie; "French Representations of Citizenship and Immigrants: The Political Dimension of the Civic Link" in *Immigrants and Minorities*, vol. 22, July/November 2003, p.262-279.
- Dumont, Louis; *German Ideology: from France to Germany and Back*, Chicago, London, University of Chicago Press, 1994.
- Heath, Anthony, Taylor, Bridget, Brook, Lindsay and Park, Alison; "British National Sentiment" in *British Journal of Political Science*, 29, 1999, p.155-175
- Hjerm, Mikael ; "National Identities, National Pride and Xenophobia: a Comparison of Four Western Countries", *Acta Sociologica*, vol.41, 1998, p.335-47
- MacCrone, David and SurrIDGE, Paula; "National Identity and National Pride", British – and European – Social Attitudes, the 15th Report. How Britain Differs, Ashgate, 1998.
- Miller, David; *On nationality*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995.
- Parekh, Bhiku ; 'Defining British National Identity', *The Political Quarterly*, vol.71(1), Jan. 2000, p.4-14.
- Schnapper, Dominique; *Community of Citizens: on the Modern Idea of Nationality*, New Brunswick, N. J., Transactions, 1998.