

Algeria and the dual image of the intellectual [\[1\]](#)

Lahouari ADDI

Professeur à l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Lyon

In J. Jennings and T. Kemp-Welch, *The Century of the Intellectual: From the Dreyfus Affair to the Rushdie Affair*, Routledge, 1997

Sommaire

- [The organic intellectual and the critical intellectual](#)
- [The Algerian intellectualism and the colonial situation](#)
- [The competition between francophones and arabophones](#)
- [The Imam-teachers](#)
- [The francophones: A secularised elite](#)
- [The isolation of the francophone intellectuals](#)

Texte intégral

This article is dedicated to the memory of Tahar Djouat writer and journalist, murdered in Algiers in June 1993.

The assassination of Algerian intellectuals has shaken public opinion throughout the world. People have asked themselves how is it possible that knowledge and artistic creation can be attacked in the name of a political project, whatever it might be. But in Algeria, beyond the narrow circle of professional colleagues and close friends, these assassinations have not been counter-productive for the Islamists, whose communiqués announce the execution of unbelievers. How is it that Algeria has become indifferent to the murder of its intellectuals? In order to explain this indifference, we need to make reference to the two types of intellectual bequeathed by the colonial experience: the francophone intellectual, separated off from the population, and the Arabic-speaking intellectual, who strongly identifies with that population. But before looking at this in detail, it is useful to consider the diverse contours of the figure of the intellectual, especially in two countries where they have played an important political and ideological role: Russia and France.

## [The organic intellectual and the critical intellectual](#)

Each national history produces its own political actors with different goals and different forms of action. This is why, across different countries and different cultures, there does not exist an ideal type of the intellectual. In other words, there is no such thing as the *Standard* intellectual. To give several illustrative examples: Russian society, faced with the process of modernization in the second half of the nineteenth century, saw the emergence of the nationalist *organic* intellectual who, along with his illusions and his faith in Utopia, believed that it was sufficient to be heard by - or to replace - the Prince. In this way, from the summit of the State, knowledge and the values of the avant-garde considered as expressing the aspirations of humanity for justice, equality, and so on, would flow down upon the backward

masses. At the end of the nineteenth century the Russian *intelligentsia* became aware of the relative backwardness of their country, and hence embraced Marxism as a simultaneous critique of both state power and society. It was not simply a question of criticizing the absolutism of the Czar but also a matter of seizing power from him in order to modernize society and to create the people's state. The Russian intellectual opposed the existing political power in the name of an ideal contained within a political project. After the revolution of 1917 he entered the service of the new state in order to put this project into concrete form. He was, then, an *organic intellectual* in the sense that his mission was not limited to a simple critique of power, since he chose to share in it. [2] This pattern, established over a hundred years ago, was reproduced once again with the process of *perestroika* in the 1980s.[3]

Very different from the Russian experience, the French situation also presents a paradigmatic example, where the intellectual, perceived as the heir of the Enlightenment and as critic of both state and society, is synonymous with a commitment to universal values. This type of intellectual appeared with great effect at the time of the Dreyfus Affair, but it did not date from this time, even if the word "intellectual" came into general use with the Dreyfus Affair. The writer hostile to power and the philosopher critical of society certainly predate this event, and Voltaire would be a good example of this. Power in France has always had to deal with the spirit of Voltaire. In general, the intellectual has been on the left, but there have obviously been intellectuals of a right-wing disposition: Raymond Aron, for example, was the same kind of intellectual but he was not on the left.

The debate in France about the intellectual has for long been concerned, and in an obsessional manner, with what Julien Benda had already called by 1927 the *treason of the intellectuals*. [4] As an expression of critical judgement that appeared with the emergence of the social sciences, the intellectual in France has been distrustful of a state that has been suspected of absolutism. By the same token, he has always feared that his actions would be exploited in order to further strengthen the power of the State, perceived as an evil force driven by the temptation to encroach upon individual and public liberties. The worry of a Julien Benda, expressed in similar terms fifty years later by Régis Debray, is that Voltaire will become an organic intellectual, an accomplice to power; and hence the word *treason*. In general, the intellectual in France has been on the side of civil society. always attentive to the absolutist tendencies of power and ready to denounce them. The uneasiness of left-wing intellectuals during the 1980s - an unease given expression in the debate originated by then minister Max Gallo [5] - derived from their attitude towards the socialists in power. The intellectual in France embodies an anti-state counter-culture, but suddenly there was a state which, in its language, laid claim to the values of justice, equality, and so on. As a result, something previously unseen occurred: intellectuals of a right-wing disposition adopted a critical and oppositional stance towards the State whilst the intellectual of the Left became "voiceless".

## The Algerian intellectualism and the colonial situation

What has this to do with Algeria? As the historical situation is different, so the problem is posed in a different way. Indeed, to understand the specific characteristics of the Algerian situation we need to return to that history. Algeria is the contradictory product of a colonization which was a system based upon the complete exclusion of the vast majority of Algerians. This system did not allow the discussion of ideas and could not be influenced by

the confrontation of ideas, and from this was derived the political weakness of the intellectual who was incapable of influencing the course of events. The intellectual elite - and by this is meant all those educated people capable of delivering either a written or oral message in which political or social ideas are expressed - was composed of both a French-speaking element and an Arab-speaking element. These two components of the elite, although they had the same social origins, did not convey the same political and social message, did not have the same attitude towards the colonial system and did not therefore have the same image of society to defend. This division within the elite took shape under colonization and did not diminish with independence; on the contrary, it tended to become further accentuated.

In the colonial situation, the person of French education did not have the social prestige of the intellectual in France, someone who is capable of having an impact upon public opinion. He was respected in his local neighbourhood because of his personal success, but at a political level his neighbourhood was wary of him because he was suspected of wishing to reproduce or to defend the colonial system whose culture he knew and from which he personally profited. The French-speaking intellectual was perceived as belonging to the colonial camp, especially as very often he was married to either a *pied-noir* or a French woman he had met while being a student. This impression was not completely false, because, impregnated with French culture, he was fascinated by the ideas of the eighteenth Century. However, for him colonization was a personal affront on two counts: it injured Algeria, his homeland, but it also injured the image that he had of France. He condemned the colonial system as being unworthy of the France of 1789 and denied the colonial settler the right to lay claim to Robespierre and Saint-Just. He tried to explain to his fellow countrymen that the colonial system was not France, but he did not succeed in convincing them. He had a "positivist" (in the nineteenth-century meaning of the word) outlook on his society, deploring its sociological archaisms. He was critical of its patriarchal ideology, the relationship between father and son, and of the position of women, in the latter case regretting their social backwardness and passivity (which gave rise to his choice of a French woman as wife). At a subjective level, he remained attached to his homeland through his mother, for whom he felt deep affection. But politically he was drawn to the French model of social relations. The ambiguity of the francophone intellectual has its origin in this stark division: attracted to France, he remained deeply attached to the cultural sensibilities of his country.

At a political level, he was not well organized but, on becoming a nationalist, he sided with the reformist movement led by Ferhat Abbas. The latter, a pharmacy graduate of the Sorbonne in 1919 and married to a French woman, called for gradual reforms which, in time, would lead to independence, whilst respecting a French cultural heritage that was perceived as an object of value and in a positive light. [6] It is this political position that explains the weak levels of support from amongst the popular classes enjoyed by the party of Ferhat Abbas, the *Union Démocratique pour le Manifeste Algérien* (UDMA). For the greater proportion of Algerians colonization was France and its culture; worse still, modernity itself was assimilated to French colonization. Thus, the manner in which Algeria was colonised determined the attitude of Algerians towards modernity and this attitude would have consequences, especially after independence.

It is from this that derives the importance of the *oulamâ* or Muslim cleric as the principal competitor to the francophone intellectual. His religious discourse stands as a defence of tradition against the cultural aggression of modernity. It is not therefore by chance that nationalist doctrine - which in turn inspired the nationalist movement and later the independent state — was to be the work of these Muslim clerics who utilized the cultural

patrimony of the past to block the advance of modernity which, in their view, stood accused of justifying colonialism. Already under colonialism, therefore, there existed two types of Algerian intellectual: one, the francophone, imbued with French culture, critical of both the colonial system and of the social structure of the traditional society from which he originated; the other, the arabophone, concentrating on questions of culture and finding in religion the resources to oppose French ideological influence and colonial domination. The credibility of the language of one or the other amongst the masses was clearly determined by their respective attitudes to the colonial system.

When the insurrection began in 1954, the francophone intellectual finished up by siding with the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN), which conferred upon him administrative organizational tasks. No intellectual became part of the leadership of the *Front de Libération Nationale/Armée de Libération Nationale* (FLN/ALN). More telling still, Ait Hamouda, alias Colonel Amirouche, leader of one of the six FLN commands (*wilaya III*), had hundreds of *maquisards* who spoke French executed on the grounds that amongst them would have been traitors who informed the French army about the movements of the ALN. Amirouche was able to proceed with this purge, known under the name of *bleuïte* or protection from double agents, because of the anti-intellectual sentiments found in the FLN in particular and amongst the population in general.

After independence, the two types of intellectual opposed each other on the question of development. The francophone wanted to utilize the State in order to resolve the country's economic and social problems; the arabophone wanted to invigorate the country's language and religion in order to revive its Arabic-Islamic cultural heritage. Similarly, by force of circumstances, the francophone intellectual was at one and the same time both *organic*, in the Russian sense that he deified the State, and *critical*, in the French sense that he attacked the forms and structures of traditional society from a perspective of development. Conversely, the arabophone intellectual was hostile towards the State but a defender of a society that he wished to extract from what was frequently described in stereotypical language as "the cultural and political perversion introduced by the West".

## **The competition between francophones and arabophones**

As has already been indicated, the situation of the intellectual in Algeria has distinctive features that derive from the history of the country and from the conditions through which its society was drawn into the process of modernization and confronted political modernity. Profoundly destructured by a colonial population settlement that lasted for over a century, in the days following its independence Algeria had to face a series of cultural problems that related to its national identity, as well as social and economic problems whose solution would be found through development. This set of different problems expressed itself through divisions within its elite, the francophone section emphasizing economic development to address social issues like unemployment, illiteracy, population growth and malnutrition, whilst the arabophone section were preoccupied with the consolidation of Arabic-Islamic cultural identity. [7] These two sections of the elite had always coexisted within the nationalist movement under colonialism and were both present in the apparatus of the State at the point of independence, each connected by compromises from which strategic considerations were not absent in either camp. But, paradoxically, whilst it was assumed that

independence would bring them together and serve to create a new elite, it pushed them further apart and even set them against each other. [8]

On one side, the arabophones, close to the people at the level of culture, pursued their utopian dream of reviving the pre-colonial cultural past, whilst on the other, the francophones, attracted by universal values, sought to graft on modernity through the vehicle of the State. Divided culturally and ideologically, the elite was also divided at a political level over the control of posts within the machinery of the State, a struggle that was not without material considerations. The State used the francophones for their technical competence, giving them jobs in economic planning and administrative management, and used the arabophones in matters relating to culture and ideology: in teaching, in the ruling party, and in the media. The linguistic divide ran throughout the State machinery, including the army, but tended to be less strong at the summit of power probably because of a group solidarity amongst those involved. An illegitimate power depends upon its internal cohesion.

But the arabophone elite, in contrast to the francophones, was not limited in size to those of its members who worked in the highest levels of the state apparatus. It was also strongly represented in society as a whole, where it clothed itself in a religious language which ordinary people could understand. Appearing frequently on television, the arabophone intellectuals there defended social values in terms of religious morality and championed what political language in Algeria calls the national constants (*ettawabit el watania*), the ideological values upon which the nation was founded. These are principally two in number : the Arabic language and Islam. This discourse found its continuation in the mosque where, in time, it drifted, on one hand, towards demands about identity and, on the other, towards opposition against the State from a moral point of view.

With the collapse of the managed economy, thought at the outset to provide legitimacy to those in power, the francophone elite found itself doubly discredited due to the fact that it had for long been identified with the economic policies of the State, providing them with scientific credibility. For example, the university economists, for the most part francophones, organized conferences and wrote articles and theses which showed the scientific basis of what became the dominant economic discourse recommending the "non-capitalist route to development, of socialism, of the system of controlled prices and of manufacturing industry". [9] By contrast, the arabophone elite, which had shown itself to be disinterested in the social problems of development, did not feel itself implicated in the economic failure and reaped the rewards for its cultural discourse. This position allowed it to move into opposition and to present itself as the ideological voice of the people in their opposition to the State, now accused of being controlled by francophones characterized as *hizh frança* (the party of France). Put schematically, the francophone was the *organic intellectual* identifying himself with a state which he wished to be the instrument of modernization and of social transformation; the arabophone, drawing upon a religious discourse, was a *dissident* who believed that this state corresponded in neither form nor substance to the cultural heritage of a society whose political expression he presumed to be.

## The Imam-teachers

The arabophone elite grew considerably in size due to the arabization of education and its democratization. Composed largely of teachers, this elite grew close to the population through the religious discussions that took place in the local mosques. After his classes, the teacher

would frequent the mosque, lead evening prayers, and often lead discussions on the Koran, making references to current events, challenging the consciences of the believers and the responsibility of the country's leaders. These teachers, having volunteered to take on the role of *imam*, displayed certain specific characteristics: they were young (aged between 25-40), had not followed the traditional form of training in the teachings of the Koran, did not live off the generosity of the inhabitants of their district [10], and were virulently subversive in their sermons. Their impact and their authority over their local population derived from the religious form of their language and its aggressive stance towards the government and its Western allies who, according to them, sought to weaken Islamic morality through the liberalization of customs, most notably by means of the emancipation of women. What was new about this, therefore, was that in the recent past these moral criticisms had been voiced by old people who had been deeply respectful of tradition. The same moralistic discourse of the earlier Muslim cleric was henceforth to be delivered in a menacing, vigorous and aggressive tone, with a definite political goal, and was conveyed by young men who were by training teachers, doctors, engineers, technicians, and so on. Abbassi Madani, founder and president of the FIS, is a professor of educational psychology at the University of Algiers; Ali Belhadj, his deputy, teaches in an institute of higher education; Abdelkader Hachani, the man who replaced them after they were both arrested in June 1991, is an expert in hydrocarbons. Beyond their professional activities, they lead the evening prayers in their neighbourhood mosques and conduct debates on social themes (the role of women, justice, corruption in civil service, etc.) using a language that has drawn enormous crowds to them. They have built their fame upon an aggressive rhetoric directed against the government and based upon a religious rule of conduct. They have subsequently transcended their status as *clerics* and have become men of politics who, with the help of the crowds that follow them, seek to seize hold of the State in order, they specify, to ensure that it conforms to the dictates of morality.

This part-time *imam*, who attracts the interest of believers who come to listen to him in the evening, is usually a government employee, either a teacher (*ousted*) in a school or university, a doctor (*hakim*) in a hospital, or an engineer (*mouhandess*) working in a state enterprise. He is not therefore a person without social position, with an irregular income and dependent upon the good nature of his neighbourhood, but rather he belongs to the privileged strata of society, possesses a house and car, and enjoys the salary of a government employee paid regularly into the bank. The authority conferred upon him by his function as *imam* is thus reinforced by a social status that identifies him with the francophones who, in the eyes of the faithful, have the pretension of monopolizing the attributes of social modernity.

By the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, these *imam*-teachers had become important social phenomena. Invited to funerals and to marriage ceremonies, they preached their message, had it recorded on cassettes, to be listened to again and discussed in the home. Moreover, when this elite, born with independence, first interested itself in public affairs, social matters and the State, it became a political actor that, at the outset, the government underestimated because the latter presumed that it could bring this new phenomenon under control when the need arose.

Entering into opposition towards the end of the 1980s, the *imam*-teachers presented themselves as dissident intellectuals, preaching the divine word, calling for solidarity and social justice, condemning corruption and the liberalization of morals, denouncing attacks on religion. If one can define the intellectual as an individual whose speech relates to social values and who finds an audience amongst a wider public, then these *imam*-teachers are intellectuals. But they are intellectuals in a society where the autonomy of politics has not

been established, where religion has not been secularized, where the individual has not been set free from the communal mentality which imprisons him and refuses him his political liberty. The *imam* intellectuals have a public in a society where public opinion does not exist, if one understands by public opinion that political actor which changes parliamentary majorities and governments on a regular basis. The *imam* intellectuals are oppositional but not critical, because the critical analysis of social practices is rejected by the religious ideology, of which they are the bearers. This is why, at the level of government, they do not criticize either the idea of a one-party state or the supremacy of the army within its institutions. They oppose only the men who are in charge of those institutions and propose to replace them. Nor do they criticize society with a view to changing its social structure; they are reproachful only of the fact that it has become distanced from God, and propose to reverse the process. The *imam*-teacher is therefore an oppositional intellectual who wants to become an organic intellectual within the movement for which he campaigns. But the religious dynamic is such, that there will always be oppositional clerics, even in a state which proclaims itself to be religious, because amongst Sunnite Muslims there exists no hierarchy which is the depository of religious authority.

## **The francophones: A secularised elite**

But why, beyond, his rhetorical skills, did Ali Belhadj, a figure emblematic of the *imam*-teacher, become so popular and not, for example, Said Saadi, a doctor who entered politics, or even Norreddine Boukroh, a bilingual journalist who created a party making an appeal both, to Islam and to modernity? There are two reasons which can be given to explain the inability of these two figures to create popular political movements. The first is that they are perceived as having an ideological connection with the State, whose language has been that of Western modernity, and therefore as not having the potential to break with the FLN state. This impression was confirmed by the fact that the parties they created recruited their members essentially from social categories at the margin of the State: civil servants, technical specialists, doctors, lawyers, most of whom were French-speaking. The second reason is that the secular character of their language – despite the fact that it was as critical of the government as that of the Islamists – associated them, in the eyes of ordinary people, as turning their back on religion.

The so-called democratic parties have no support amongst the poorer sections of society because they all come up against the Islamic Utopia which encourages the popular masses to believe that it is possible to organize the State democratically upon the basis of a fear of God. If it is suggested that the fear of God is not sufficient to guarantee equality and social justice nor to prevent corruption and the abuse of power, the reply is that you do not sufficiently believe in God. The secular elite therefore finds itself faced with a conception of social relations according to which religious morality should be at the heart of those relations; it finds itself before a conception of politics where politics, at a formal level, cannot be autonomous from religious conscience. The assassination of francophone intellectuals can be explained in part by this moral conception of politics, a conception which they do not share.

The ideology of democracy arouses suspicion from the moment that it is defended by a secular elite, especially when it is a largely French-speaking elite. This is not to say that, the masses who have voted recently in elections for the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) have voted against democracy. [11] In the FIS vote, there is beyond the desire to sanction those in power, a call for democracy that is formulated both implicitly and in a contradictory manner. The

popularity of the FIS rests upon democratic demands that relate to participation in the world of politics from which Algerians are excluded, and that also relate to participation in the world of social modernity through such things as work, housing, the facilities associated with urban life, being treated with dignity by the administrative machinery of the State, and so on. Religion is perceived by the masses as the means of access to this modernity which respects their cultural identity. There is therefore a deep democratic impetus in the protests of the Islamists, but it is a protest which does not express itself in the normal words and language of democracy.

This is why there is disagreement between the francophones and the populace, and this disagreement relates as much to the discourse of the francophones as to its secularized content. The people do not understand the arguments of the francophones, whilst the latter, in turn, do not understand that the people formulate their social hopes in religious terms. This mutual incomprehension is a measure of the distance that exists between an elite which wishes that the social aspirations of the people be formulated in a secularized discourse, and a people who do not understand that the elite - or a part of the elite - does not give an important place to religion in its political discourse. This mutual incomprehension between the two entities will last until the point that it is dispelled by historical experience, that is, up to the point that the FIS exercises power. It is only the defeat of the FIS and its incapacity to keep its promises, and therefore the incapacity of religious discourse to ensure equality and the dignity towards which the people aspire, which will bring about a rejection of religious discourse in political struggles. I have called this process through which the Islamists will lose their popularity one of "fruitful regression". [12] The error of the secular elite was not to remain democratic in January 1992, when they should have opposed the annulment of the elections and denounced the torture and arbitrary imprisonment that was being inflicted upon the Islamists. The vote of December 1991 was a vote whose effects would in time have brought the people nearer to the secular elite. The quashing of the elections, by contrast, created an infernal dynamic which has further distanced this elite from the populace for what will be a long period, and to incomprehension has been added hatred and the feelings of revenge.

The violence which broke out brought into stark confrontation the State, supported by the army, and the Islamists, enthused by their electoral victory. Those social groups at the periphery of the State – doctors, journalists, technical specialists, French-speaking teachers, in short, all those that in Algeria are called intellectuals - had to decide what side they were on. Their ambiguity was that, whilst they were hostile to the Islamists, they did not unduly demonstrate their support for the army. It is from this that questions and doubts arise about the authors of the killings each time an intellectual is murdered in Algiers.

## The isolation of the francophone intellectuals

But the killing of francophone intellectuals has been - and is - only possible because there does not exist a university system that can be seen to be autonomous of the State and which, consequently, can gain credibility amongst different publics. It is precisely because the francophone intellectuals are not politically and professionally credible and do not have a public, that they can be killed like rabbits. The systematic policy of the leaders of the newly-independent state to combat any slight desire for autonomy in society – be it economic, religious, in the trade unions, universities or the press - gave the francophone elite no chance

of being credible in the eyes of the population. Such an elite, emerging independently of the State, could have provided an alternative to the language of religion, or at least limited its hegemonic influence over a society which, in order to show its distrust of government, took refuge in the politics of Islam.

The assassination of intellectuals has not evoked a disapproval from the population which might have persuaded the murderers not to commit further crimes. This shows the position that intellectuals have in their society. The funerals of the victims, exploited by state television as a weapon of propaganda against the Islamists, confirms the average viewer in the belief that the deceased was a supporter of the government. In a programme devoted to the murder of intellectuals broadcast in May 1994, the arabophone writer Tahar Ouettar replied to a question, addressed to him by a journalist from the *Arte* channel, that the death of Tabar Djaout was a loss for his own children and for France, but not for Algeria. [13] Beyond what this horrible phrase tells us of the hatred which exists between Algerians, the fact that Tahar Ouettar was not rebuked by a wider public for having murdered Tahar Djaout for a second time, says much about the isolation of the francophone intellectual in Algeria.

The origin of this isolation lies in the existence of a political domain that is dominated in a coercive and non-ideological manner by the power of the State, which itself is in the hands of the army. This has prevented the emergence of civil elites, with the exception of those social groups that it employs within its institutions and in the economic sector, where, in any case, it exercises power. Even the university is prevented from producing its own elite, being refused its own administrative autonomy and facing opposition from the government towards its reviews and research groups. The rectors of universities - up to the end of the 1980s recruited from amongst doctors and dentists - and of educational institutes were chosen by the relevant government ministry, after consultation with the army, for their willingness slavishly to serve the administrative hierarchy of the State. The principal concern was that the university system should not be a focus of opposition, having elites with which different levels of the population would self-identify. The universities being blocked off, the oppositional elites emerged from the mosques and in such numbers that they were difficult to control. [14]

But it would be an exaggeration to say that the power of the State alone has prevented the emergence of a secular elite because, in point of fact, the development of such an elite has faced obstacles of a historical, social and ideological kind. Rather, the State has not sought to encourage the emergence of an elite possessing social recognition. It has not aided this process because it feared that this elite would be a competitor to the army, the only institution conceived as providing members for the ruling elite.

Fundamentally, a politically relevant elite cannot be formed before there appears a public opinion operating in a political space that is occupied by political parties, trade unions, associations and newspapers offering both opinion and information. Certainly, public opinion, in the sense of a homogenous political actor obeying a political rationality and reacting as an individual, has never existed. [15] However, what is commonly called public opinion is that collection of different currents of opinion that cross civil society, united around a minimum consensus concerning the procedures of accession to power and the legitimacy of opposition. Public opinion does not express itself through a single party or movement, nor necessarily through a series of parties. Public opinion does not indicate the degree of cohesion or integration of a society, but only that a consensus exists about the way in which differences in society are addressed. Electoral opinion is an illustration of the existence of public opinion as a determining element in the political sphere and domain.

The force of the intellectual derives from his ability to influence public opinion. If the latter does not formally exist, if it does not intervene on a regular basis so as to change the occupants of power, the intellectual remains the individual respected in his neighbourhood for his social status – doctor, journalist, lawyer, university lecturer, and so on – and not as a political actor who influences public debate in the direction of modernity. It is here that resides the principal difference between the intellectual who is critical of the social structure and its forms of collective representation and the oppositional intellectual. The francophone intellectual is critical in a society obsessed by the defence of its cultural identity; the arabophone intellectual is oppositional in a country where the political regime has been rejected. The isolation of the one and the popularity of the other have the same cause: the majority of the population want to change the personnel of the political regime without putting into question the collective and symbolic forms inherited from the past. It is through this fundamental contradiction that society will modernize itself, unhappily at the price of terrible suffering, because nowhere does the unfolding of history conform to reason and intelligence, which alone are capable of saving suffering.

Article translated by Jeremy Jennings.

#### Notes

[1] This chapter is a revised version of a paper presented to *the annual seminar of Centre d'Analyse et d'Intervention Sociologique* (CADIS), held between 22-24 September 1994 in Durban, and first published in *Esprit*, January 1995, p. 130-8. I thank the participants of this seminar and especially A. Bérolowitch, N. Guénif, Y. Pozo and L. Zhang, for their comments.

[2] Antonio Gramsci used this expression to characterize those persons who, because of their skills and knowledge, were recruited by the capitalist state in order to ensure the dominance of bourgeois ideology.

[3] "The drama of Russian society and the drama of those who consider themselves as belonging to the intelligentsia lies in the long and painful passage from infantilism to maturity... It is understandable that the confusion of those who call themselves democrats should open the door to the most obscure and dangerous forces. If democracy does not possess its cultural and moral elite it will become an oligarchy, an adventurist political dictatorship that will mobilize the masses and manipulate them." (J.A. Levada, « Le problème de l'intelligentsia dans la Russie aujourd'hui ».) I thank A. Bérélowitch for having drawn this unpublished text my attention.

[4] See. J. Benda, *La Trahison des clercs*, Paris, Grasset, 1927. See also R. Debray, *Le Pouvoir intellectuel en France*, Paris, Grasset, 1979. Benda's text can be found as *The Betrayal of the Intellectuals*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1955; whilst Debray's text has been translated as *Teachers, Writers, and Celebrities: The Intellectuals of Modern France*. London, Verso, 1981,

[5] See M. Gallo, "Les intellectuels, la politique et la modernité", *Le Monde*, 24 July 1983.

[6] See B. Stora and Z. Daoud, *Ferhat Abbas*, Paris, Fayard, 1994.

[7] There were arabophones who were sensitive to questions of development, but they were not numerous. For example, the editorial board of the arabophone newspaper Al-Khabar was not attracted to the language of the Arabo-Islamists. The Islamists made fun of the paper by calling it the arabophone publication of the francophones,

[8] A policy of bilingualism might have overcome this division, but after independence it was shelved as being too problematic.

[9] Inspired by the ideas of the French academic G. Destanne de Bernis, it was this strategy that directed Algerian economic policy to the 1970s. The model showed that for a country such as Algeria it was better to begin by developing heavy industry rather than the light industry that would produce consumer goods.

[10] Under colonialism, the *imam* of the mosque who lived in urban areas was dependent upon the charity of his neighbourhood.

[11] For a more detailed assessment of the situation, see L. Addi "Democrats caught in the crossfire", *The Times Higher Educational Supplement*, 10 November 1995; L. Addi, « Dynamique infernale en Algérie », *Le Monde diplomatique*, October 1995; and L. Addi. « Dynamique et contradictions du système politique algérien », *Le Monde* 29 November 1995.

[12] See L. Addi, *L'Algérie et la démocratie*. Paris, La Découverte, 1994, and "Islam and Democracy", in H. Adenius (ed.), *Democracy's Victory and Crisis*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, forthcoming.

[13] Tahar Djouat was a poet and founder of the weekly review *Ruptures* (eds).

[14] For an assessment of the attacks of Islamic fundamentalists upon university personnel, see S. Hughes. "Rector murdered by Islamic hitmen", *The Times Higher Education Supplement*, 10 June 1994 (eds).

[15] See P. Bourdieu. « L'opinion publique n'existe pas », *Les Temps modernes*, 318, January 1973, pp. 1292-1309.