



SOPAS: A LOW-COST AND SECURE SOLUTION FOR E-COMMERCE

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ABSTRACT

We present in this paper a new architecture for remote banking and e-commerce applications. The proposed solution is designed to be low cost and provides some good guarantees of security for a client and his bank issuer. Indeed, the main problem for an issuer is to identify and authenticate one client (a cardholder) using his personal computer through the web when this client wants to access to remote banking services or when he wants to pay on a e-commerce site equipped with 3D-secure payment solution. The proposed solution described in this paper is MasterCard Chip Authentication Program compliant and was experimented in the project called SOPAS. The main contribution of this system consists in the use of a smartcard with a I²C bus that pilots a terminal only equipped with a screen and a keyboard. During the use of services, the user types his PIN code on the keyboard and all the security part of the transaction is performed by the chip of the smartcard. None information of security stays on the personal computer and a dynamic token created by the card is sent to the bank and verified by the front end. We present first the defined methodology and we analyze the main security aspects of the proposed solution.

INTRODUCTION

E-commerce is one of the most challenging issue in computer science nowadays. Many e-payment architectures have been proposed in the last decade (Kleist, 2004; Konar, & Mazumdar, 2006; Ekelhart et al., 2007). Nevertheless, very few have been used in real conditions for e-commerce. One major reason is that the defined solution must be supported by major card schemes such as Mastercard or/and Visa. In the following, we present two solutions that were defined within this context.

To limit the risk that the customer can repudiate his payment transaction, a set of companies (Visa, MasterCard, GTE, IBM, Microsoft, Netscape, SAIC,

Terisa system, Verisign) have developed, in the eighties one solution call SET (Secure Electronic Transaction). The customer's bank sends him one certificate issued from one CA (Certification authority) of a PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) which is stored on his computer. When he wants to realize a payment on the Web, the customer must sign with the PKI keys (Rennhard et al., 2004).

Another solution for electronic payments is 3D secure (3D-Secure Functional Specification, 2001) developed by VISA and used by MASTERCARD. The commercial trademarks are « Secure Code » for MasterCard and « Verified by Visa » for Visa. The term 3D is the contraction of "Three Domains":

- Acquiring domain (acquiring bank and merchant) ;
- Issuer domain including the customer authentication;
- Interbank field which makes it possible the two other fields to communicate on Internet.

The client realizes his purchase on a merchant's Website that is 3D-secure compliant and click on the payment icon ("MasterCard SecureCode" or "Verified by VISA"). He is invited to enter his card scheme, card number and expiration date. The MPI (Merchant Plug-In) installed in the merchant's website, contacts the Visa or MCI directory to obtain the Internet address of the issuer. Then, using the client's personal computer, the MPI contacts the issuer with a formal PAREq (Payer Authentication Request) message. The client's authentication is under the bank responsibility. When that last task is realized, the bank issuer answers to the MPI of the merchant's website with a formal PAREs (Payer Authentication Response) message. The MPI sends an authorization request to the acquiring bank which transmits it to the issuer which will answer with an authorization number. This last dialog is realized to be completely EMV compliant (Europay MasterCard and Visa). The internationally agreed standards for chip payment cards. EMV standards are maintained by EMVCo (EMVCO, 2000). In fact, with 3D-secure, the authentication problem from the customer / merchant domain is replaced by the customer / issuing bank domain (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: The different communications in 3D-secure payment

The most important challenge today in the 3D-secure architecture for a bank issuer, is to authenticate one client with as many guarantees as possible with the lowest cost. The goal of the SOPAS project in which we are involved in, is to propose new e-transaction architecture. The objective is then to develop a secure and a low-cost solution that can be attractive for banks considering security and commercial issues. We show in this paper some elements on the security of the proposed architecture and the reasons why we think this solution can be supported by major card schemes.

We describe in the next section, the proposed architecture defined within the SOPAS project. In the third section, we focus on the security issues of the proposed solution. Conclusions and perspectives of this work are given in the last section.

SOPAS PROJECT

The idea of the SOPAS project is to fulfill two services for one client. The first one is the payment on an e-commerce site equipped with a 3D-secure payment solution. The second service deals with remote banking and concerns the use of a personal computer by a client through the web to access to his bank account and to realize different operations (consultation or bank transfers for example). We think that the proposed solution must allow this last service for economical reasons. A bank could be ready to adopt the solution even it will cost some more money if it can offer an additional service for a client. Remote banking is generally a service that is rarely free for a client. A more secure remote banking could be more expensive for a client but will provide also some more secure e-commerce possibilities. We present in the next subsection some more details on targeted services by the SOPAS project.

Objectives

First, we have in particular to fulfill the client needs to use Internet to carry out its remote banking operations. Today, implemented solutions have the main drawback to be based on a password authentication that is not really secure (Pfitzmann et al., 1997). Thus, the SOPAS project has two major objectives:

- to gain the user's confidence;
- to provide a secure solution whose cost of deployment is as cheap as possible.

The client must be able to realize different operations such as those detailed in Table 1:

Table 1: Remote banking operations

Operations	Examples
Standard operations	Consultation, transfer, direct debit ...
Credits	Consummation credit, real estate credit...
Assurance	Assurances subscriptions for automobiles, home...
Saving & Shares	Opening of a saving account, stock buying & selling

These transactions are very sensitive if we consider the financial impacts of an uncontrolled use. So, before any access to a banking site, a preliminary authentication is required. When the client is authenticated, the remote banking site proposes all the possible operations.

For certain operations realized by the client, it could be necessary:

- To protect against all alterations, the transaction exchanges between the client and the bank;
- To guaranty the good achievement of the transaction to the client;
- To have the client's agreement proof.

All that objectives (authentication, integrity, good achievement and client's agreement proof) can be realized by question/answer mechanisms:

- The bank generates a question and the client uses a personal device to generate an answer to the bank;
- The bank verifies this answer for the authentication process or to validate the transaction.

Second, one client must be able to make a payment on e-commerce websites in an easy and a secure way. We assume here that the merchant is 3D-secure compliant. This is not a strong hypothesis as it is supported by MASTERCARD and VISA.




Figure 4: Interface Protocols

We can highlight the different parts of the figure 4:

- The SOPAS Card communicates directly with the personal device (equipped with a keyboard and a LCD screen) by a different interface than which is used to communicate with the personal computer. The protocol used is then I²C (ISO, 1995). This is particularly important from the security point of view of the solution. This bus makes it possible the card to interact directly with its cardholder by presenting him some information via the LCD screen and while requiring some information (like his PIN code) via the keyboard of the personal device. These two operations thus do not require the intervention of the computer which is considered as a non secure element.
- The SOPAS card communicates directly with the user's personal computer with USB protocol via the personal device.
- The user's personal computer is exchanging information with the front end of the issuer bank using HTTPS protocol because the network is Internet.

Architecture

The following diagram (see figure 5) details the architecture and the relationships between the card and the personal device. We can observe that the USB and I²C bus allows the card, either to communicate with the customer's personal computer via the USB interface, or to communicate directly with the personal device in order to reach its keyboard and its screen.

The second circuit (I²C bus) strongly takes part in the security solution. The CAP token is calculated by the card, after the PIN code verification, then sends via the different devices without any modification and control to the HSM (Hardware Security Module) connected to the Bank Front End. So, only the two secure devices (Card and HSM) are able to calculate or verify the Token.




Figure 5: SOPAS architecture

SECURITY ANALYSIS

The objective of the section is to provide an analysis of the SOPAS solution as regarding the security aspects. We study the whole chain in order to determine the potential risks, then to provide some associated countermeasures. This analysis can lead us to possibly modifications of the specifications of the final solution. This is particularly justified by different attacks (phishing and pharming) against remote banking services and the different well known attacks in e-

commerce and e-payment. We will endeavor to show that these attacks are completely identified within the framework of this analysis. It will appear that the SOPAS solution can then, in addition to being a solution of customer's authentication by his bank, can be a good solution for the bank authentication by the customer, making thus inoperative the previous attacks.

Methodology

To realize that study, we have used the EBIOS method (DCSSI, 2004). The card operating system answers the safety requirements evaluated according to common criteria (ISO, 2006). During the personalization of the card, the later remote applet loading is blocked. The card and the personal device are delivered by the bank, and the card delivery follows the standard bank card protocol (security requirement) and is delivered in a face to face situation by the bank. The delivering of the PIN is sent to the cardholder by the standard PIN mailer procedure.

Due to its cost, the personal device is an object which cannot be repaired and which is the subject to a standard exchange in the case of problems (in that eventuality the material is destroyed). The cardholder uses the SOPAS architecture in a personal environment and known conditions as standard use (for example without a company network environment...). The personal computer operating system is an area of risk whose protection is out of the study perimeter. The remote banking server (software and hardware) follows completely the security bank requirements. The bank is supposed to have correctly dimensioned and protected its architecture against mass attacks. The contract aspect between the cardholder and the bank must be reviewed by the bank lawyer and are not covered by this study. The SOPAS Smart card is not only a debit or credit card but includes also a CAP capability.

Results

The perimeter includes the following security domains:

- The user,
- The SOPAS smart card,
- The personal device (with its screen and keyboard),
- The link between the personal device and the client personal computer,
- the client personal computer,
- The bank server,
- The link between the bank server and the client personal computer.

The components, directly concerned by the SOPAS solution, appear in the top left hand in Figure 6. The total perimeter of the study is represented by an ellipse in Figure 4. The red entities inside the perimeter are those whose risks are excluded by the assumptions or

whose countermeasures do not concern directly the SOPAS solution. For example, the SOPAS solution cannot ensure that the client personal computer is free from any virus software. In the same way, SOPAS cannot ensure that remote banking server is suitably configured, dimensioned... Nevertheless, for the red elements belonging to the perimeter, the analysis will be able, if necessary, to propose a countermeasure.



Figure 6: Study perimeter

The perimeter of this study integrates the data processing sequence of the authentication, from the card to the interface of the banking server. Before using the SOPAS smart card, procedures of personalization and distribution are necessary. Although, these last do not belong to the perimeter of the SOPAS solution.

The study of the vulnerabilities realized enables us to formulate a list of risks incurred by the essential elements. The transformation of these risks in scenario makes it possible to better apprehend them and judge their gravity. In this study, we formulate 19 risks. The majority of them concerns the banking data of the user or the technical information allowing the authentication of the customer by his bank.

The incurred risks are:

- The lost of availability ;
- The usurpation of identity ;
- The break of the RSA Keys of the SOPAS smart card (Anderson, 1994) ;
- The deterioration of banking data ;
- The disavowal of action ;
- The right abuse ;
- The divulgation ;
- The illicit processing of data.

During this study, a certain number of threats were identified. The threats which were retained are those which have a direct impact on the authentication mechanism. Additional threats, mainly on the remote banking server (except authentication function) were sometimes retained because it will have been judged that the SOPAS smartcard and the SOPAS personal device could thwart these last. They are mainly the threats and risks induced by the use of a personal computer to which remote banking services cannot grant its confidence. Indeed, it is not rare that the computer has been infected by a Trojan horse and

became victim of the technique known as of the pharming.

It was shown during the study that the SOPAS solution makes it possible to cover the risks thus identified by associating to him a functionality of checking to a banking server certificate. That prohibits a fraudulent site to be recognized as being the bank. The user's personal computer not being confident, it is of primary importance so, on one hand, the checking of the server certificate must be embedded in the smartcard and, and on the other hand, the result of this checking must be shown on the personal device screen.

Finally, the risk of disavowal an action was retained because the authentication of a user does not have any value of assent on an action realized between the beginning and the end of connection. This implies the need for the user to sign each remote banking operations (of a sufficient amount). The signature functionality is in fact already present in the SOPAS smartcard but is just used for the user authentication by the bank.

This analysis also showed that, so far as we suppose that the user personal computer is safe (what is not the case but that nevertheless is posed like assumption), the encryption of the communications between the SOPAS smartcard and the user personal computer is not necessary. Indeed, the messages forwarding between these two devices are challenge/answer type, and are secured by that way. Coding from beginning to end would be a solution to mitigate the vulnerability of the personal computer which, by the presence of the malevolent programs, could deteriorate the banking data. This solution is however not realistic since at one time or another, the banking data must be posted on the screen of the personal computer.

To conclude this part, the SOPAS smartcard decreases the risks induced by the potential vulnerabilities of the personal computer. Indeed, the secrecies of connection of the user cannot be recovered any more by a simple keylogger or other spyware and attacks it by replay is not more exploitable. The use of a certificate embedded in the card and the checking of the bank certificate by the SOPAS smart card could further decrease the risks induced by phishing and pharming techniques. Nevertheless, the use of a personal computer that is not controlled (by the bank) remains the Achilles' heel of this service. Recurring problems here are found: how to protect data in an hostile environment?

CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES

The SOPAS solution is made up of a personal device (card reader, screen and keyboard pilot via the I²C bus by the card) and a smart card (Multi applicative card with the embedded SOPAS solution and standard

EMV), the cost of the card is a little bit more expensive than a standard EMV chip card (6 to 8 €) but the personal device is very cheap (10 to 20 €). This makes it possible for the bank to deliver cards and personal devices to their clients interested for secure remote banking services and e-commerce.

Thus, the equipped user is able to generate a "CAP token" that he transmits to the bank like an authentication value, when he wishes to reach his remote banking services or to pay on the Web. The bank is convinced to deal with the good person because the smartcard, before generating the token, requires from the customer to enter his PIN code (known only by the card and the card holder), thus resolving the problem of the CAP token generation.

The security analysis of that solution shows that if we consider the limits created by the use of a unsecure personal computer, the SOPAS approach is a very good and secure solution compared to its deployment price.

There are some perspectives of this work. Two main changes are possible in order to limit the possibility for the user to repudiate his action:

1. To oblige the user to sign each remote banking operations (of a sufficient amount).
2. To use CAP Token generation options. In the Cap protocol, it is optionally possible to include the transaction amount and currency in the CAP transaction. This option is indicated by a flag in the card application, bit 8 of the IAF (Internet Authentication Flags).
- 3.

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